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ABSTRACT 
This research analyzed prior enlisted Marine Officer 
Retention and their relationship to military paycaps.  An 
analysis of the data showed that retention behavior of 
prior-enlisted Marine Officers differs from non-prior Marine 
Officers.  Prior-enlisted Marine Officers are more likely to 
remain on active duty after their initial service obligation 
and serve a full career in the Marine Corps than Marine 
Officers with no previous military experience.  Prior-
enlisted service has a positive effect on retention to 20 
YOS.  A Marine Officer with sufficient time in service stops 
receiving longevity pay, and experiences the phenomenon 
known as pay compression.  The lack of pay raises for six 
years or longer may be a disincentive to continued service, 
although prior-enlisted Marine Officers have higher 
retention rates than non-priors at every stage of their 
careers.  The results of this study suggests that Mustang or 
prior-enlisted Marine Officers with at least 8 years of 
prior service retire at a higher rate than regular officers 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Under the mandate of the National Defense Authorization 
Act of Fiscal Year 2008 (section 403), the Marines Corps is 
currently expanding its force structure.  Presumably, more 
field-grade officers will be required to fill that 
expansion.  This call for expansion requires more officers 
to be commissioned via the normal sources of commissioning: 
the United States Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (NROTC) units, Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 
and Platoon Leadership Course (PLC), as well as enlisted 
source commissioning programs such as the Marine Enlisted 
Commissioning Education Program, the Enlisted Commissioning 
Program, and the Meritorious Commissioning Program.   
B. BACKGROUND 
 Although Marines leave the corps for various reasons, 
some individuals decide to pursue a career as a Marine 
Officer and look toward retirement some time into the 
future.  Prior-enlisted Marines (known as “Mustangs”), 
especially those commissioned through these special 
programs, must have at least ten years of commissioned 
service before becoming retirement eligible.  At some point 
in their career, Marines volunteer to retire and leave the 
military to work another job while collecting retirement pay 
to maximize earnings, while others choose to continue their 
service to the Corps. 
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1. The Military Active Duty Retirement System 
Currently there are two different types of retirement 
plans in existence for active duty Marines: the High-3 Year 
Average retirement plan and the Career Status Bonus 
(CSB)/REDUX retirement plan.  Only Marines who have entered 
after 01 August 1986 may select the CSB/REDUX retirement 
plan.  Marines who entered the Corps before 01 August 1986 
fall under the High-3 Year Average retirement plan.  Once a 
career Marine reaches 15 years of active duty service, he or 
she will have to choose one of the two retirement plans.     
Marines who retire with 20 years of service under the 
High-3 Average plan will receive 50 percent of their highest 
three-year average of base pay and an annual cost of living 
adjustment (COLA) based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
for the remainder of their life.  For each additional year 
of service past 20 YOS, the multiplier increases by 2.5% 
until that Marine reaches High Tenure (30 years of service).  
At 30 years of service (YOS) the multiplier reaches its 
maximum of 75% of base pay.   Marines who choose the 
CSB/REDUX retirement plan at their 15th year of service will 
receive the Career Status Bonus ($30,000) and incur a 20-
year obligation to the military.  Acceptance of the 
CSB/REDUX plan reduces the highest three-year average base 
pay multiplier from 50% to 40%.  These retirees will receive 
an annual COLA adjustment for the remainder of their life.  
Each additional year of service past 20 YOS increases the 
multiplier by 3.5% until the Marine reach High Tenure (30 
YOS maximum service).  At 30 years of service the multiplier 
reaches a maximum of 75% of base pay. 
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2. The Payscale Cap 
 Most service members receive biannual pay raises; 
however, prior-enlisted Marines encounter a pay cap later in 
their career.  A Marine Officer with sufficient time in 
service stops receiving longevity pay, and experiences the 
phenomenon known as pay compression.  The only pay raise of 
any kind that a prior-enlisted Marine can expect at that 
point is an annual Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), 
dependent on the actions of Congress and the President, that 
is intended to keep salaries in pace with inflation.  Pay 
compression affects all officer grades from O-3E to O-7 
starting at 18 years of service, and grades 0-8 to 0-10 at 
26 years of service. In Table 1 the cells with dark borders 
indicate where the pay cap affects Marines according to 
their pay grade and total years in service.   
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 For example, a Marine Corps Captain (Paygrade O-3E) 
will have reached the maximum on the military pay schedule 
after 18 years of service and would have to wait until the 
promotion to the next pay grade, the rank of Major (O-4), to 
receive an actual pay raise.  At that point the Marine would 
have once again reached the maximum on his or her pay 
schedule, and would not see another non-COLA pay raise until 
the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel (O-5).  The wait for 
selection and promotion to Lt. Col. could take an additional 
6 to 7 years and there is no guarantee of promotion.   
 To bear such a risk and not be promoted alongside their 
peers would presumably be a huge dissatisfier to career 
Marine Officers.  As a result of the “up and out” policy 
created by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 
1980 (DOPMA), a determined Marine Officer who was not 
promoted to Lt. Col. at the first opportunity could wait 
until being passed over by a second Lt. Col. (0-5) selection 
board one year later before being forced into retirement.  A 
“twice-passed-over” Marine can appeal to the Continuation 
Board to remain on active duty; however, Continuation Boards 
are “convened based on the needs of the Marine Corps and 
criteria [vary] from year to year.” (MARADMIN 187/07, 2007)    
 On the other hand, if a prior-enlisted Marine is 
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel after 26 to 27 years of 
service, the Marine will only have one tour and very few 
career opportunities remaining before reaching High Tenure.  
The prospects of remaining on active duty past 26 years of 
service would diminish considerably for that career Marine.  
The fact of no pay raise for six years or longer, coupled 
with the risk of not getting promoted and having no future 
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career, could be a major disincentive to continue service 
for a Mustang on track for retirement.  
Nevertheless, once an individual Marine Officer is 
eligible for retirement, he or she will have to make a 
career decision based on personal considerations.  It is 
reasonable to suggest that when an individual has no more 
prospects of future pay raise and expects to collect a 
pension with retirement benefits (commissary and exchange 
privileges, TRICARE for life, etc.), that the individual may 
elect to leave the Marine Corps.  Although it is difficult 
to predict each individual’s discount rate and ascertain the 
reason for continuation or retirement, one can compare the 
rate at which normal Marine Officers retire against that for 
Marine Officers who have reached the pay cap at the point of 
retirement eligibility and determine if the pay cap might be 
one factor that drives Mustang (prior-enlisted) Officers to 
retire. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to identify whether the 
capped military pay scale influences Marine Officers to 
retire after 20 years of service. For this study, “prior 
enlisted service” or “Mustang” refers to individuals with at 
least 4 years of active service as an enlisted member of the 
armed forces and who are eligible for the special base pay 
rate (O-1E to O-3E).  This study will assist Marine Corps 
policymakers (HQMC Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in 
predicting Marine Mustang Officers’ retirement behavior.  It 
will serve as an example for Marine Corps officials to seek 
and implement policy alternatives in order to adjust for the 
effects of a capped military pay scale on officer retention.   
  7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CIVILIAN TURNOVER 
Labor economists define the constant flux of people 
entering and leaving work from an organization as employee 
turnover.  Generally, turnover is described as consisting of 
voluntary or involuntary separation.  Voluntary separation 
is where an individual employee quits, resigns, or ceases 
his or her relationship with an organization.  Involuntary 
separation is where the organization severs employment ties 
with the worker in the form of a “layoff” or direct firing.  
This research and literature review focuses on voluntary 
separation and its determinants.  
Civilian labor turnover produces one of the highest 
economic burdens for institutions.  Initially, the immediate 
deficiency of personnel decreases productivity and is 
results in costs for an organization.  The additional cost 
of replacement saps the organization of more limited 
resources.  “Replacement costs may be broken down into 
recruitment costs, selection and placement costs, on-the-
job-costs, and separation costs.” (Gaudet, p39)  The formal 
training and time invested in employees costs money, and 
companies view the shortfall of an employee before they 
maximize their return-on-investment as an additional loss of 
resources. 
Job turnover is usually costly and detrimental to 
the organization.  A logical step in this 
direction is to identify the factors which 
correlate with turnover and thereby provide a 
focus for the efforts of organizational planners 
and personnel managers in reducing the rate of 
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attrition.  From a theoretical standpoint, 
turnover represents an individual level decision 
which is the result of individual, 
organizational, and external environmental 
factors. (Shanahan, p. 1)   
Although people work or quit working for different 
reasons, industrialist psychologists believe that these 
behaviors and factors can be identified as motivation and 
categorized as intrinsic or extrinsic values (a belief known 
as Expectancy Theory).   
1. Intrinsic Motivation 
Generally, intrinsic refers to the psychological 
rewards that individuals seek gain to satisfy psychological 
needs (whether social or self-fulfillment).  In the case of 
this study, individuals receive psychological rewards from 
belonging to an organization.  These psychological rewards 
influence the feelings and attitudes of an individual.  An 
individual may derive prestige or fulfillment from belonging 
to an organization or may enjoy the social camaraderie of 
fellow members.  If the organization treats its members 
positively or has a positive atmosphere and environment, its 
members receive psychological gratification.  Conversely, 
the psychological response and level of activity would 
decrease if the individual perceives a negative reward.        
In the workplace, these intrinsic values are called 
intrinsic motivation.  According to Industrial Psychologists 
Tiffin and McCormick, intrinsic motivation is “related to 
the task itself” and suggests that “there is some direct 
relationship between task and the goal of the learner, such 
as in the case of a mechanic who achieves satisfaction from 
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a job well done.” (Tiffin and McCormick, p. 277)  Intrinsic 
motivation in the workplace leads to job satisfaction, “a 
person’s attitude regarding his or her job and work 
content.” (McShane and Von Glinow, p. 75)  Social 
psychologists suggest that work behavior, performance, and 
organizational commitment are tied to job satisfaction.  
Psychologists classify the positive and negative 
psychological reactions as satisfiers and dissatisfiers.   
Satisfiers are positive “factors associated with work 
activities such as advancement, recognition, responsibility, 
the work itself, and etc.” whereas dissatisfiers are 
“unsatisfactory conditions related to such factors.” (Tiffin 
and McCormick, p. 352)  Social psychologists point out that 
“people gravitate to work situations that meet their needs, 
and as a result their overall job satisfaction goes up.” 
(Lawler and Worley, p. 243)  Dissatisfaction within the work 
environment may induce poor work behavior, apathy, or a lack 
of commitment.  Lawler and Worley state that “when employers 
are dissatisfied with their jobs, they are saying that they 
do not see positive consequences associated with remaining 
part of the organization as it presently operates” and they 
“typically begin to look for employment and leave if they 
find a situation that offers a better mix of rewards.” 
(Lawler and Worley, p. 243)   
Policymakers must be cautious with labeling all 
employees that quit working as disgruntled.  Sociologist 
James Price recognizes that “not all individuals who leave 
are dissatisfied, and not all dissatisfied members leave.” 
(Price, p. 6)  Individuals may depart an organization due to 
family or other personal reasons, not necessarily as a 
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reaction to the work environment.  Although the influence of 
intrinsic values may be strong, it does not always 
necessarily override the weight of extrinsic motivation.  
Sociologist Geoffrey Ingham discovered that motivation 
factors vary for workers of different skills and different 
sized organizations.  His findings indicate that workers 
“choose to maximize their earnings” at larger factories 
tending to “deflate their non-economic awards” whereas some 
workers choose “interesting work” over higher wages. 
(Ingham, p. 91 & 110)  Nevertheless, job satisfaction is a 
personal matter.       
2. Extrinsic Motivation 
Extrinsic values are external influences on an 
individual.  Extrinsic motivation is the desire to obtain 
rewards or benefits in belonging to an organization.  The 
individual may be given an award, commendation, or pay in 
recognition of performance or promised an incentive to 
remain within an organization.  In the workplace, these 
rewards are commendations (medals, trophies, certificates, 
plaques & etc.), fringe benefits (tickets to sporting 
events, free parking, travel vouchers, preferred club 
membership and etc.), vacation/sick leave, or financial in 
nature (extra pay, bonuses, awarded stock options and etc.).  
 Extrinsic motivators can be effective in recruiting and 
retaining employees.  Social psychologists reveal that 
“individuals vary significantly in terms of what they 
consider valuable, attaching different degrees of importance 
to such rewards as money, recognition from a supervisor, and 
a ride on a mechanical bull.” (Lawler and Worley, p. 239).  
Price argues that pay is a great motivator in obtaining 
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commitment to an organization.  He believes that 
“successively higher amounts of pay will probably produce 
successively lower amounts of turnover.” (Price, p. 68)   
Overall, “individuals look for those aspects of 
jobs which are related to their own value 
systems, some place greater value on, say, 
security others on income, others on type of 
work, etc.” (Tiffin and McCormick, p. 358)  Yet, 
although people’s value systems differ from one 
another, “there sometimes is at least a moderate 
consistency in the values of individuals within 
certain groups.”  (Tiffin and McCormick, p. 358)  
It is through the research of military turnover 
that we can recognize this “individual/group 








B. MILITARY TURNOVER (OFFICER RETENTION) 
The causes for civilian turnover and military turnover 
are quite similar.  Job satisfiers and other motivations are 
not unique to civilians; the same identifiers and 
determinants are seen throughout military surveys.  
Extrinsic motivators that influence Marine Officers to 
remain on active duty include fringe benefits, world travel, 
leadership opportunities, training and professional 
education.  After the initial obligation period, some Marine 
Officers voluntarily leave due to their failure to adapt to 
the organizational culture.  Where some Marine Officers 
discover dissatisfiers in multiple deployments and a high 
workload, other Marines feel challenged and make a conscious 
choice to make it a career, at least until their values 
change or they become retirement eligible.     
As with the civilian sector, it is universally accepted 
that “the more training and experience an individual Marine 
Officer receives, the greater the investment for the Marine 
Corps” and that “the individual officer becomes more costly 
to replace.” (Theilmann, p. 2) Beyond their initial 
obligation, Marine Officers decide whether to stay or leave 
active duty.  Ideally, the Marine Corps should seek to 
maximize its return on investment in Marine Officers through 
their retention for a full 30 years of service, the maximum 
length of service permissible, for a more robust officer 
corps.  In preventing the loss of a Marine Officer, the 
Marine Corps strengthens the officer corps and retains 
corporate knowledge.  
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1. Study by Theilmann (1990) 
Theilmann attempted to determine the factors that 
convinced junior Marine Officers to remain on active duty 
after serving their initial service obligation.  
Additionally, he tried to examine if these factors are 
dissimilar for Marines in different occupations.  By 
predicting company grade officers’ behavior, policymakers 
can forecast cycles and plan for manpower losses. 
The literature review provided an overview of research 
on both civilian and military turnover.  The study used data 
from a survey, the 1985 Department of Defense Survey of 
Officer and Enlisted Personnel, and data gathered by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center.  Theilmann used only the data 
concerning male company-grade Marines and discarded the 
rest.  With a sample size of 456 observations, the author 
used a binary logit regression to analyze the effects on 
officer retention of a multitude of factors that included 
demographic traits, tenure, primary MOS, cognitive traits, 
commissioning source, marital and dependent status, 
perception of job opportunities, retirement benefits, 
government housing, community outlook, and intrinsic and 
extrinsic attitudes. 
The findings indicate that “the factors that strongly 
influence male, junior officers to remain on active duty 
beyond their initial service obligation are their 
commissioning source, marital/dependent status, military 
occupational specialty, race, and intrinsic and extrinsic 
job satisfaction factors.” (Theilmann, p. 49)  Theilmann 
discovered that being commissioned through ROTC and USNA had 
a positive effect on officer retention in comparison to 
  15
OCC/PLC.  To Theilmann’s surprise he learned that ROTC had a 
greater positive effect than the Naval Academy on retention.  
Married officers with children and officers serving in 
combat roles favored staying in the Marine Corps more than 
others.  Minority officers chose the military over civilian 
work when compared to whites.  
Although the data showed that intrinsic values held a 
slightly larger positive impact over extrinsic on behavior 
predictability of Marine Officers, they both weighed heavily 
on an individual’s decisions to stay military.  The 
following table shows those extrinsic and intrinsic values 
that had the most positive effect from Theilmann’s thesis 
study.   
 
Table 3.   Theilmann’s Job Satisfaction Component 
INTRINSIC EXTRINSIC 
SATISFACTION WITH CO-WORKERS SATISFACTION WITH 
PROMOTIONS 
HAPPY WITH JOB JOB SECURITY 
FRIENDSHIPS JOB TRAINING/IN-SERVICE 
EDUCATION 




PERSONAL FREEDOM COMMISSARY SERVICES 
OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE COUNTRY PAY AND ALLOWANCES 
(Source: From Theilmann, 1990) 
 
                
2. Study by Zinner (1997) 
Zinner tried to identify the turnover factors that 
drive junior Marine officers to either remain or leave 
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military service.  Additionally, he examined whether the 
influences of retention behavior were different between 
single and married Marine officers.  The literature review 
and research mirrors that conducted by Theilmann.  However, 
in addition to extrinsic and intrinsic values, Zinner 
focused on the personal concerns such as individual’s 
intent, civilian opportunities, force structure reduction, 
and military experience and job skills applicable in the 
civilian job market. 
Zinner utilized data assembled from the 1992 Department 
of Defense Survey of Officers and Enlisted Personnel and 
Their Spouses and the applicants’ Master Loss File.  In 
merging the two files, he determined whether the officer’s 
response to the survey and their intent actually correlated 
with their actions.  After focusing on junior grade male 
officers with fewer than seven years of service, further 
restrictions reduced the data to 779 individual observations 
as the sample size.  The author analyzed the effect of 
“personal information,” “internal work-related” and 
“external related” influences on retention by using 
multivariate logistic regression. (Zinner, p. 29)   
Zinner expected the variables married, commissioned 
through USNA or ROTC, possessing a combat or pilot/Naval 
Flight Officer role, or overall satisfied with military life 
(intrinsic and extrinsic values) to have a positive effect 
on the decision to remain on active duty.  According to the 
findings, “the factors that influence significantly the 
members’ decision to remain on active duty included: 
commissioning source; occupational specialty; deployment to 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm; satisfaction with various 
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intrinsic aspects of life in the Marine Corps; concerns with 
the force drawdown; whether or not the officer had searched 
for civilian employment in the last twelve months; and 
whether or not the officer believed that the skills he had 
acquired in the Marine Corps would be transferable to the 
civilian market.” (Zinner, p. 78)   
3. Study by Perry (2006) 
Perry analyzed Marine officer occupations and their 
effects on retention at 10 years of commissioned service 
(YCS) and field-grade promotions.  With a Marine Corps 
Commissioned Accession Career (MCCOAC) data set for FY1980 
to FY1999, Perry created logistic retention models that 
tested the dependent variables “gender, marital status, 
ethnic group, commissioning age, commissioning fiscal year, 
prior enlisted, TBS class standing, [and] PMOS/occupational 
groups” on the propensity of the officer to remain for 10 
YCS. (Perry, p. 59)  He theorized that being married, having 
an older age at time of commissioning, commissioned through 
MECEP/MCP or USNA, being a pilot or having a combat PMOS 
would have a positive effect on remaining in the Marine 
Corps.   
The findings show that out of all the Primary Military 
Occupational Specialties within the Marine Corps only pilots 
(with the exception of EA-6B and C-130 pilots) had higher 
retention than infantry (the base PMOS).  Marine Officers in 
support related occupational specialties were more than 
likely to leave the Corps.  Furthermore, the effect persists 
when the occupations are lumped together by their 
occupational field.  “All PMOSs within the combat arms, 
ground support, and service support occupational fields have 
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a negative and significant effect on retention when compared 
to the base [PMOS].” (Perry, p. 68)  The aviation PMOS 
(excluding the aviation support) had a positive association 
with retention, whereas all other occupations possess an 
association that is negative when compared to combat arms.  
This could be due to the increased obligation that comes 
with being a pilot.  As expected, class standing at The 
Basic School has a positive effect and is indicative of 
higher performance throughout a career.  Older-aged officers 
and those officers commissioned through MECEP/ECP are more 
than likely to remain in the Marine Corps until 10 years of 
commissioned service.  
4. Study by Cakmak (2004) 
The author examines the factors and personal 
characteristics that lead Marines to remain on active duty.  
Using combined data collected from the 1999 United States 
Marine Corps Retention Survey and individual workforce 
records, Cakmak divided the Marines into four categories: 
first-term enlisted males, first-term enlisted females, 
career enlisted males, and company-grade males.  Although 
the survey examined 17,324 records, it gave a sample size of 
332 junior grade male officers.  The study eliminated 
individuals that had over 12 or fewer than 5 years of 
service, or were over 45 years old.  
The author’s retention model assessed the effects of 
“personal and military background, family status, pay and 
benefits, civilian opportunities, satisfaction with job and 
specific aspects of life in the military” on predicting 
behavior through multivariate logistic regression. (Cakmak, 
p. 41)  Cakmak predicted that military housing, non-combat 
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arms occupation, years of service, USNA, and job 
satisfaction would have a positive effect on company-grade 
male officer retention.  The study revealed several 
findings: (1) that the greater the opportunity for the 
transferable of skills to the civilian marketplace, the 
higher the probability the Marine officer will leave the 
Marine Corps; (2) officers who hunt for civilian jobs are 
indicating a strong intent to leave active duty; (3) living 
in government housing has a positive effect on retention; 
(4) married officers without children are more likely to 
depart from active duty than single officers, or married 
officers with dependents; (5) job satisfiers such as health 
benefits, work equity, and future career opportunities 
influence officer retention. (Cakmak, p. 70-72)       
5. Study by Branigan (2001) 
Some studies have theorized that individuals in 
possession of graduate education may be more productive than 
those without an advanced degree.  However, there is a 
perceived notion within the Marine Corps that possession of 
a Master’s Degree does not provide any benefits towards 
retention.  An advanced degree leads Marine Officers to exit 
the service and pursue higher paying jobs.  Branigan 
challenged this conception in his study on the effects of 
graduate education and the behavior of Marine officers. 
In his “Accession Cohort Sample,” Branigan collected 
data from multiple sources: Promotion Board data for In-zone 
population of Majors for FY98 to FY01 Lieutenant Colonel 
Promotion Boards (from the Manpower Plans Division at HQMC); 
Officer Cohort Data “Longitudal TBS File” with commissioning 
data from 1979 to 1984 (from the Center for Naval Analysis); 
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Cohort Data with additional characteristics such as PME, 
marital status, and prior enlisted status (from both Defense 
Manpower Data Center West and Manpower Information and 
Performance Evaluation Divisions HQMC); and Graduation Data 
(from the Registrar Naval Postgraduate School). 
Branigan created the following categories to test his 
theory: cognitive traits (NPS grad, Masters, GCT score), 
affective traits (served in combat, prior enlisted service, 
commissioning source, PMOS type), performance traits (TBS 
GPA, Awards, PME), career traits (unemployment rate, Fiscal 
Year in which the Marine Officer was in-zone for promotion 
board), and demographic traits.  He expected officers with 
advanced degrees to have a greater advantage at promotion 
and higher propensity to remain on active duty than Marines 
without the higher education.  With a sample size of 6,507 
Marine Officers, Branigan ran a series of simple probit 
models (23 models) to estimate the effects and then 
subsequently ran a Chi-square test to determine if there 
were any changes across the Fiscal Years.  
Overall, the results indicate “that officers with 
graduate degrees from any source... are all more likely to 
survive than officers without any [graduate] degree at all.” 
(Branigan, p. 59)  He also discovered that Marines with a 
successful career, who were married with dependents, pilots, 
or had combat experience had the tendency to remain in the 
Marine Corps until eligible for selection to Lieutenant 
Colonel (O-5).  He notes that “the career-minded officer who 




education programs can look forward to a long, secure career 
and anticipate a greater chance of promotion to O-5.”  
(Branigan, p. 85)    
6. Study by O’Brien (2002) 
This study analyzed the effect of commissioning 
enlisted Marines to determine the predictability of their 
behavior.  O’Brien argued that the Marine Corps could reduce 
attrition through the accession of high-quality enlisted 
Marines through commissioning programs.  He tried to 
ascertain: 1) if those Marines stayed until their 10th year 
of service and 2) whether they remained on active duty until 
they satisfied retirement requirements.   
The author used the Marine Corps Commissioned Officer 
Accession Career file gathered by the Personnel Management 
Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia.  
This file is a combination of data collected from several 
sources (including The Basic School and Marine Corps Total 
Force Structure data files).  Capturing twenty years of 
officer cohort data, O’Brian focused specifically on fiscal 
years 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989.  Due to the scarce number 
of females and MCP Marine Officers, the author dropped them 
from the data file.  
After correcting for errors, O’Brien ran binary logit 
regressions for his two retention models on 5,172 
observations.  The retention models measured the effects of 
commissioning program, TBS class standing, GCT score, 
race/ethnicity group, marital status, and Primary MOS on the 
dependent variables (staying until 10 years of commissioned 
service, and staying until eligible for retirement).  The 
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author anticipated that Marine Officers who fell into the 
category of white, commissioned through MECEP/ECP, married, 
or top in their class at TBS would likely remain on active 
duty.  On the other hand, O’Brien expected individuals that 
were a minority, graduated at the bottom of their TBS class, 
or in a combat MOS to have the propensity to leave active 
duty. 
The author discovered that the data supports his first 
hypothesis; that enlisted commissioning programs had a 
positive effect on remaining on active duty for 10 years in 
comparison to the other commissioning sources.  However, to 
O’Brien’s surprise the data showed that the commissioning 
source had no significant effect on predicting an “officer’s 
retention-to-retirement” behavior.  O’Brien believed that 
“the officers from MECEP provide a strong and stable mid-
grade officer corps that can provide continuity to their 
respective occupational fields.” (O’Brien, p. 58)  
Furthermore, he recommended that “the Marine Corps should 
assess more officers through this source this source to 
provide to provide flexibility to the commissioning source 
mix.” (O’Brien, p. 58)       
C. RETIREMENT DECISION 
Although there have been a multitude of studies that 
examined retention of officers past their initial military 
obligation, very few research the social and financial 
factors, and behaviors that influence careerists (career 
Marines) to decide when they should retire.  Of the studies 
that are available, most of them focus on the financial 
aspect that weighs on a careerist’s decision-making.  
Although military careerists cannot predict their financial 
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needs with absolute certainty, income presumably has a 
strong influence on their decisions.  All career Marines 
make the conscious choice to retire at some point within 
their career.   
Careerists recognize that after retirement they are 
entitled to continue enjoying the fringe benefits they 
received while on active duty.  These non-pecuniary benefits 
may no longer influence a careerist to remain on active duty 
since they will be available after retirement.  Intrinsic 
motivation may no longer have a strong influence over career 
Marines as it had at the initial onset of their career.   
For officers with dependents, some decisions are based 
on family needs: (1) economic stability, (2) no more 
deployments away from home, (3) more quality time with 
family, (4) and assistance in rearing of offspring.  
Careerists may encounter an increasing financial burden with 
children entering college when coupled with fewer wage 
increases.  Most Marine Officers are young enough after 
twenty years of service to find a second career in the 
civilian marketplace.     
1. Study by Lenz (1967) 
Lenz believed that the Military Retirement System has a 
positive effect on retention until retirement eligibility; 
yet once an individual passes that point, other factors have 
stronger influences on their decision to remain in or leave 
military service.  He developed a model to determine whether 
“the existing combination of active duty pay and retired 
military pay opportunities, when matched with civilian 
second career employment opportunities, provide financial 
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incentive toward continuation of military service beyond the 
minimum required for voluntary non-disability retirement”. 
(Lenz, p. 18)   His “wealth maximization hypothesis,” he 
argues that as individuals near retirement, they seek to 
discover the optimum point, by which to retire in order to 
maximize their income. (Lenz, p. 18) 
Lenz focused on the behavior of Naval and Marine Corps 
Officers in the pay-grades of 0-5 to 0-8 who retired between 
1955 and 1964.  He combined official military data with 
individual responses obtained from a mailed survey.  The 
survey asked questions concerning their income and other 
factors.  With a sample size of 4,230 retirees, Lenz 
conducted a statistical analysis of the officers’ lifetime 
income to determine the effects of the financial incentives 
on retirement.   
The findings indicated that the financial incentives 
had a negative effect on an extended career.  The study 
revealed that “both retirement age and education level had a 
significant impact on the second-career earnings of members 
of the population.” (Lenz, p. 145) The younger (earlier) a 
naval officer retires, the greater the job opportunity and 
potential income.  Another finding showed that the longer 
one remains on active duty, “second-career income levels and 
employment rates decline.” (Lenz, p. 199)  Advanced degree 
holders “tend to retire at earlier ages than do the Bachelor 
degree holders and non-degree holders.” (Lenz, p. 199)  
Individuals who held an advanced degree prior to retirement 
had a profound economic advantage in the civilian workforce 
over those without it (and slightly over those who earned 
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the degree post-retirement); yet, this effect decreases over 
time and is minimal at the full retirement age.     
Additionally, Lenz learned that remaining on active 
duty does not fully maximize income: a 0-6 officer who 
retired involuntarily could earn a second-career income that 
rivals that of a 0-8 flag officer.  Early retirement carries 
a risk to job security, whereas in this example the flag 
officer bears the risk of fewer job opportunities and less 
income in a second career.     
Lenz also discovered that the “military retirement pay 
profile component values which decline with advancing age 
are a factor contributing to the general lack of financial 
incentive to an extended military career.” (Lenz, p. 139)  
Earlier in the study, he stated that “a failure to offer 
subsequent longevity increases can, with some justification, 
be interpreted as an indication that the military 
organization is not interested in retaining those 0-5 and 0-
6 officers who are not promoted to the next rank”. (Lenz, p. 
90)  Given the payscale cap, any individual that desires to 
increase his or her cash flow would be influenced to look to 
another source, a second career in civilian employment.  
Overall, “in assessing the results produced by the model, 
there appeared to be a general lack of significant positive 
financial incentives for officers to remain on active duty 
for a maximum length military career.” (Lenz, p. 200)     
2. Study by Berkebile and Gaudi (1976) 
As the eligibility point draws near, a careerist will 
have to decide whether they will retire at 20 or 30 years of 
service.  Berkebile and Gaudi (1976) analyze the factors 
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that lead Naval Officers to retire.  Berkebile and Gaudi 
proposed that not everyone fully weighs the risks involved 
with such a choice.  Berkebile et al. recognized that “the 
prospect of leaving the military at such an early date will 
force the officer to face several major problems including: 
the standard of living he can expect after retirement, the 
transferability of his military skills to the civilian job 
market, the severity of the psychological adjustment from 
military to civilian life, and the possibility of a loss of 
economic and/or social status.” (Berkebile, p. 12)  They 
encouraged extensive retirement planning well in advance of 
a final decision being made.  Berkebile focused on putting 
the risks and merits into tangible pecuniary form. 
Berkebile and Gaudi used the present value of Naval 
Officer’s (O-4 & O-5) retirement income as an example to 
show the effects of time on the value of money at two 
different discount (interest) rates.  They hypothesized that 
individuals could calculate their retirement stream and 
determine how to maximize their overall income.  Berkebile 
and Gaudi’s findings indicated that a delay in retiring 
could lead to diminishing employment opportunities due to 
increased age and that the individual would be unable to 
maximize his or her income.  The study did not specify the 
most favorable point for retirement; this is subject to the 
Naval Officer’s economic position. 
Berkebile and Gaudi proposed the use of a broader 
equation that would take into account outside income and 
expenses into the individual’s decision.  The Total Future 
Income Stream equation could assist the Naval Officer in 
dealing with the ramifications of an early or postponed 
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retirement.  They recommended that retirees should look 
beyond the financial aspect of retiring, and understand the 
difficulties associated with the transition to civilian 
life.  Additionally, they argued that retirees need to study 
the current economic situation before exiting the military.  
In the end,  
the officer must project his own individuality 
into the retirement decision.  Accordingly, he 
must consider his own goals, ideals, values, 
personality and ability when considering the 
implications of the analysis of this thesis.  
What is important to him must modify his 
interpretation of any and all situations.  
(Berkebile and Gaudi, p. 92) 
3. Study by Gotz and McCall (1979) 
In a response to the greatly increasing manpower costs 
during the mid-1970s, the Rand Corporation conducted a study 
on retirement behavior of Air Force Officers.  Gotz and 
McCall tested the then current retirement system against two 
substitute retirement systems (proposed in The Uniformed 
Services Retirement Modernization Act and The President’s 
Commission on Military Compensation), both cheaper than the 
one in place, that were in the process of being reviewed by 
Department of Defense and the Ford Administration.  They 
used data gathered from actual “Air Force personnel records 
on promotion, augmentation, military compensation, military 
pension, retirement probabilities and civilian wages.” (Gotz 
and McCall, p. 10)   
Gotz and McCall focused on the behavior of field-grade 
officers and tried to predict their actions under the three 
different retirement plans through their Dynamic Retirement 
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Model.  For the base model, they “calculated the present 
value and decision for the [base] officer facing the mean 
Air Force career path and the mean civilian wage path for 
retired military personnel.” (Gotz and McCall, p. 10)  They 
utilized a discount rate of 10% for the calculations for the 
base model and considered the individual officer to be risk-
neutral.  For the other two retirement programs (RMA and 
CMC), Gotz and McCall introduced a Cost of Leaving factor 
into the model along with the reduced pension to calculate 
the behavior of a risk-averse officer.  The findings for The 
Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act and The 
President’s Commission on Military Compensation indicated 
that along with a significant reduction in retirement wages 
and a delay of payments until the age of 60, the risk-averse 
officer would be compelled to serve the maximum 30 years of 
service due to a high cost of leaving the service.   
The findings for the base model indicated that the 
current retirement plan persuades officers to remain past 
their tenth year of service until retirement.  For example, 
according to the study “the optimal retention policy for 
majors — optimal in the sense of maximizing expected present 
value (reserve and regular) - is to stay until they complete 
twenty years of service and then retire.” (Gotz and McCall, 
p. 13)  The optimal point occurs for Lieutenant Colonels are 
at 23 years of service and for Colonels at 26 years of 
service.  Gotz and McCall discovered that “departures 
increase as civilian earnings rise.” (Gotz and McCall, p. 
15)  Depending on the pay grade, Air Force Officers retired 
early as a response to higher civilian wages as they 
outpaced military pay. 
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4. Study by Ford (1992) 
In 1989 the Soviet Union collapsed and the Department 
of Defense initiated a force structure drawdown to reduce 
manpower costs.  Three years later, Ford conducted a survey 
at the Naval Postgraduate School to investigate the factors 
that influenced separation and retirement decisions for 
Lieutenant Commanders.  Her survey focused on three 
different voluntary separation plans offered during the 
drawdown: the Special Separation Benefit (release from 
active duty with a lump sum payment and no retirement 
benefits), the Voluntary Separation Incentive (release from 
active duty with an immediate annuity and no benefits), and 
the 15-Year Retirement Plan (retire at 15 years with full 
benefits including health coverage, and a retirement plan 
similar to the 20-year retirement plan).  Ford hypothesized 
that “tenure, spousal influence, career intent, pecuniary 
motivation, non-pecuniary separation benefits, involuntary 
separation, and civilian job opportunities” carry weight in 
the decision of Naval Officers to either separate or remain 
until eligible for full retirement. (Ford, p. 11) 
With a sample size of 83 out of 137 Lieutenant 
Commanders (61% of the population responded to the survey), 
Ford ran a multivariate regression of the survey data to 
predict the separation or retirement behavior of Lieutenant 
Commanders.  Results indicated that if faced with a forced 
separation, many Naval Officers would choose the 15-Year 
Retirement Plan with full benefits; very few of them would 
consider the SSB or VSI.  All of the surveyed officers 
looked forward to remaining in the United States Navy until  
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the 20-year retirement eligibility point.  High tenure and 
spousal support had a positive effect on retention until 20 
years.   
Overall, Ford discovered that these Naval Officers “are 
a career-oriented group who, unless pressured to separate 
due to a reduction in force or failure to promote, plan to 
remain in the Navy at least until eligible for a 20-year 
retirement” and that “if the drawdown requires reduction of 
this career officer force, nothing short of an early 
retirement plan with full benefits would be perceived as 
adequate compensation.” (Ford, p. 55-56)  Additionally, 
Naval Officers perceived healthcare to be the greatest non-
pecuniary benefit that encourages them to remain until 









III.  METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The literature review points out many of the factors 
and traits that influence retention.  Due to the limitations 
of the data set (cognitive traits, performance traits, and 
career traits were not provided in the data set), this 
thesis will examine a career Marine Officer entering the 
retirement phase through exploratory data analysis.  The 
hypothesis is that Prior-enlisted Marine Officers retire at 
a higher rate than non-prior Marine Officers once they 
encounter pay compression.  Since Marine Officers with at 
least eight years of service encounter the pay compression 
near 20 years of service, they are more likely to retire at 
a higher rate than Marine Officers without prior service (a 
“non-prior”) at that point. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION  
The data used in this study comes from a longitudal 
(officer master cohort) data file maintained by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center.  The data file contained 15,372 Marine 
Officers who served in any of the years from FY1980 to FY 
2006.  This information is unclassified and does not contain 
the individuals’ social security numbers.  The Defense 
Manpower Data Center provided a unique identifier code for 
each Marine Officer in compliance with the Privacy Act.   
The data did not contain a “prior-enlisted indicator” 
that satisfied the criteria for this study (at least 4 years 
of prior-enlisted service to be eligible for special base 
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pay).  The author created prior-enlisted indicators for the 
length of service by using the difference between an 
individual’s Pay Entry Base Date and his or her Date of 
Commission (Officer Appointment Date).  The variables used 
in this study are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.  Variable Description 
Variable Variable Name Data Type Description Label 
STAY/LEAVE STAY_5 float =1 Stay if 5 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_6 float =1 Stay if 6 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_7 float =1 Stay if 7 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_8 float =1 Stay if 8 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_9 float =1 Stay if 9 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_10 float =1 Stay if 10 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_11 float =1 Stay if 11 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_12 float =1 Stay if 12 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_13 float =1 Stay if 13 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_14 float =1 Stay if 14 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_15 float =1 Stay if 15 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_16 float =1 Stay if 16 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_17 float =1 Stay if 17 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_18 float =1 Stay if 18 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_19 float =1 Stay if 19 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_20 float =1 Stay if 20 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_22 float =1 Stay if 22 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_23 float =1 Stay if 23 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_24 float =1 Stay if 24 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_26 float =1 Stay if 26 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
 STAY_30 float =1 Stay if 30 Years of Service or 
more; =0 otherwise 
Prior Enlisted 
Experience 
PriorEnlis~4yos float =1 if MO was Prior-Enlisted for at 
least 4 Years or more; =0 otherwise 
 PriorEnlis~8yos float =1 if MO was Prior-Enlisted for at 
least 8 Years or more; =0 otherwise 
 PriorEnlis~10yos float =1 if MO was Prior-Enlisted for at 
least 10 Years or more; =0 otherwise 
 Non_PriorMO float =1 if MO was never enlisted or had 
less than 4 years of prior enlisted 
service; =0 otherwise 
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C. COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A preliminary analysis of the data indicated that a 
majority of the Marine Officers within the sample 
(n=15,372), mostly non-priors, left the Corps after their 
initial service obligation.  Out of all 15,372 Marine 
Officers, 877 remained until retirement.  Retirement 
restrictions were used for loss reason codes of deaths 
(battle/non-battle related), courts-martial, unacceptable 
behavior, and permanent disabled retirements.   Overall, 
only 15 Marine Officers out of the whole population remained 
on active duty past 26 years of service and two Marine 
Officers made it to a full 30 years of service.   A deeper 
look at the data reveals the rate at which Mustang and non-
prior Marine Officers stayed past 20 years of service. 
  
Table 5.  Non-prior Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine 




Table 5 points out the ratio of Marine Officers (non-
priors and prior-enlisted) that stayed until 20 years of 
service.  Only 14.4% of the original population remained 
until the point when they were eligible for military 
retirement; and the rest of the officers voluntarily 
departed the Corps before reaching 20 years of service.  Of 
the prior-enlisted Marine Officers with at least four years 
of prior-enlisted service, 33.2% stayed until 20 years of 
service.   
 
Table 6.  Non-prior Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine 
Officers with +8 years of prior service at 20YOS and 
+10 years of prior service at 20YOS  
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Table 6 shows that prior-enlisted Marine Officers with 
at least eight years of service remained at a rate of 44.9% 
and those with at least ten years stayed at an even higher 
rate of 53.1% respectively.  The data indicates that as the 
number of years of prior enlisted service increase, so does 
the commitment to serving 20 years of service.  Quite 
possibly this shows the attractiveness of the military 
retirement system and benefits, and the desire for those who 
have more vested time in the Marine Corps to make it a 
career. 
 
Table 7.  Non-prior Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine 
Officers with +4 years of prior service at 23YOS 
 
 
After accounting for Marine Officers who departed the 
Corps before 20 years of service, the remaining population 
of retirees is examined in order to determine the rate at 
which individuals chose to remain once they attained 
retirement eligibility.  Out of 877 retirees, 689 were non-
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prior Marine Officers and 188 Marine Officers were prior 
enlisted with at least 4 years of service.  According to 
Table 7, for the Marine Officers who stayed past 23 years of 
service, prior-enlisted Marines remained at a higher rate of 
40.4% than non-priors, whose rate was of 22.5%.      
 
Table 8.  Non-prior Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine 
Officers with +8 years of prior service at 23YOS and 
with +10 years of prior service at 23YOS 
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At 23 YOS, the commitment rate decreases for Marines 
with more enlisted service time; yet, both tables indicate 
that prior-enlisted Marine Officers have a higher rate of 
retirement. 
Table 9.  Non-prior Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine 




At 26 years of service, very few Marine Officers 
voluntarily continue their service in the corps.  Only 13 
Marine Officers out of the entire officer cohort (n=15,372), 
regardless of prior enlisted service or not, had a length of 
service beyond 26 years.  Due to the small number of Marine 
Officers, no analysis past 26 years of service was 
conducted. 
D. EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 
This study uses exploratory data analysis (EDA) to 
examine the data and compare the conditional and 
unconditional continuation rates at which prior-enlisted and 
non-prior Marine Officers remained in the Corps.   
1.   Unconditional Method 
This method is used to measure the continuation rate 
for both prior-enlisted Marine Officers and non-prior Marine 
Officers for a full 30 years of service.  By plotting a 
graph using the following formulas this study attempts to 
track the behavior of Marine Officers.  The unconditional 
formula uses ratios between the numbers of Marine Officers 
in a group who had “stayed” at a point in time against the 
overall population of that group and compares that ratio to 
that of the other group. 
 
For non-prior Marine Officers: 
At Time = k, [# non-prior alive at time k] 
 [# non-prior in the data] 
 
For Prior-enlisted Marine Officers: 
At Time = k, [# prior alive at time k] 
  [# prior in the data] 
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Figure 1.   Unconditional Continuation Rate for Non-prior 
Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine Officers At 
least 4yrs of Prior Service 



























 Figure 1 data shows that prior-enlisted Marines have a 
higher retention rate than non-prior Marine Officers.  The 
rates at which the two groups decrease from nine years to 16 
years are similar; yet, at 16 YOS the non-prior group’s 
retention rate stops decreasing up until the year 20 and at 
18 YOS the prior-enlisted Marine Officers’ rate stops 
decreasing as fast up until year 20.  After 20 years of 
service, prior-enlisted Marines start leaving at a higher 
rate.  There is no distinction between the groups after 26 









Figure 2.    Unconditional Continuation Rate for Non-
prior Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine 
Officers At least +8yrs of Prior Service 



























 The retention patterns for prior-enlisted Marine 
Officers (both +8 and +10 years of prior service) in Figures 
2 and 3 respectively follow the same retention pattern as 
Figure 1 up until year 20.  After meeting retirement 
eligibility (at 20 YOS), prior-enlisted Marine Officers in 
Figure 2 and 3 retire at a faster rate than non-priors. 
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Figure 3.   Unconditional Continuation Rate for Non-prior 
Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine Officers with 
At least +10yrs of Prior Service 



























2. Conditional Method 
The unconditional method used the overall population. 
This makes it difficult to visualize differences between 
groups in the later years.  To get a better assessment of 
the officers’ behavior, the following conditional formula 
computes the ratio between the numbers of Marine Officers 
who had “stayed” at a point in time against the population 
alive for the previous year and compares that ratio across 
groups. 
  
For non-prior Marine Officers: 
At Time = k, [# non-prior alive at time k] 
 [# non-prior alive at time k] 
 
 
For Prior-enlisted Marine Officers: 
At Time = k, [# prior alive at time k] 
 [# prior alive at time k] 
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Figure 4.   Conditional Continuation Rate for Non-prior 
Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine Officers with 
At least 4yrs of Prior Service 
 



























 Although the differences in Figure 4 are clearly larger 
at the beginning, the gap between the two groups decreases 
to a point, around 17 YOS, where there is no distinction at 
all.  Though not surprising, the non-priors’ conditional 
continuation rate gets higher presumably because they are a 
few years away from retirement and there are no incentives 
to get out at 17 or 18 YOS.  For all Marine Officers, a big 
increase in continuation rate occurs immediately after year 
20.  One plausible theory for the spike is that Marine 
Officers promoted near the 20-year mark remain for at least 
three years’ time in grade to retire at the highest rank 







Figure 5.     Conditional Continuation Rate for Non-prior 
Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine Officers with 
At least 8 years of Prior Service 



























 Figures 5 and 6 also show the difference between the 
two groups that occurred at the start dissipates near 17 
YOS.  However, there is a distinction between the behavior 
of non-priors and prior-enlisted Marine Officers at around 
year 20.  The conditional continuation rate increased for 
non-prior Marine Officers, whereas the rate of continuation 
for Mustang Marines decreased within the 20 to 22 YOS 
period.  Since the numbers in these groups are small, this 
could be due to random chance, or perhaps those individuals 
tracking for retirement envisioned their career to end at 20 
YOS or shortly thereafter.  Maybe those Marine Officers who 
figured that their future Marine Officer career prospects to 
be few and opted to retire to seek another career.  
Nevertheless, the continuation rates for both groups are 
similar after 23 YOS and no causal effect can be determined 












Figure 6.   Conditional Continuation Rate for Non-prior 
Marine Officers vs. Prior-enlisted Marine Officers with 
At least 10 years of Prior Service 































IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study suggest that Mustang or 
prior-enlisted officers with at least 8 or more years of 
service do not retire at the same rate as regular officers.  
In fact, prior-enlisted Marine Officers retire at a higher 
rate than non-priors.  Coincidently, this occurs as the 
Prior-enlisted Marines encounter the pay cap.  Although a 
correlation exists, the research did not show a causal 
relation from an analysis of the data that explains the 
behavior.  Evidence as to whether the capped pay scale 
influences Marine Officers to retire after 20 years of 
service remains inconclusive from this data analysis.  
Undoubtedly, individuals choose to “stay” or “leave” 
after 20 YOS based on different motivations and personal 
reasons.  Presumably, individuals decide to absolutely and 
unequivocally depart the corps after 20 YOS once they become 
eligible for retirement benefits.  Arguably, the drop in 
manpower at 20 YOS is not as drastic as it might be due to 
other personal choices and policy mandates, such as (1) the 
recent promotees – those Marine Officers promoted at around 
20 YOS who decide to remain for three years’ time in grade 
to retire at the highest rank held and maximize their income 
and (2) the holdouts – those Marine Officers who hold out 
until the next promotion board and who if not promoted with 
their peers, then voluntarily retire before being forced to 
do so.  Although other factors like the availability of the 
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Career Status Bonus/REDUX retirement plan could play a role, 
it was not apparent in the data.  
The data does show that Prior-enlisted Marine Officers 
behave differently from non-priors.  They are more likely to 
remain on active duty after their initial service obligation 
and serve a full career in the Marine Corps than Marine 
Officers with no previous military experience.  Prior-
enlisted service has a positive effect on retention up until 
20 YOS.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. It is recommended that the Marine Corps take the 
behavior of Prior-enlisted Marine Officers into account for 
future considerations and perhaps study the expansion of the 
Special Pay Schedule to include prior-enlisted Majors (0-4E) 
and Lieutenant Colonels (O-5E) without a pay cap.  Removal 
of the pay cap could encourage quality prior-enlisted Marine 
Officers to stay past 20 years of service until service 
limitation (High Tenure) or the “up or out” policy comes 
into effect.  By eliminating a dissatisfier, the Marine 
Corps would no longer be promoting field-grade officers from 
a truncated pool of candidates for promotion, and could 
build a more robust officer corps through the retention of 
quality prior-enlisted Marine Officers.       
2. It is recommended that additional data fields that 
attribute commission source and military experience 
including “prior-enlisted” indicators, “total enlisted time 
in service” (in months or years), and a marker for military 
retirement plans be collected.  An indication for retirement 
plans could assist a future study into the behavior of 
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Marine Officers under the two different retirement plans, 
High-three and the CSB/REDUX retirement plan, and ascertain 
if either retirement influences retention past 20 YOS.  
Furthermore, the source of commissioning data field did not 
point out if the Marine was commissioned through an enlisted 
commissioning program (MECEP/ECP/MCP).  An additional 
indicator alongside other sources of commissioning such as 
the United States Naval Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer Candidate Course 
and Platoon Leadership Course (OCS/PLC) would be an 
advantage to researching the effects that prior enlisted 
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